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DISAGGREGATING THE TWO PRONGS OF
ARTICLE 13(B) OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO
COVER UNSAFE AND UNSTABLE SITUATIONS
Lauren Cleary*
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (the “Convention”) is a treaty designed to coordinate a uniform
response to international child abductions. It establishes a civil remedy for
a left-behind parent seeking the return of his or her child after the child has
been wrongfully removed to or retained in another state that is also a party
to the Convention. The Convention requires the courts of a signatory state
to order the prompt return of a wrongfully removed or retained child to his
or her state of habitual residence unless the responding party can prove that
one of the defenses available under the Convention is satisfied.
Article 13(b), which provides the most frequently cited defense available
under the Convention, stipulates that a court is not required to order the
return of a child to his or her state of habitual residence if “there is a grave
risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” To this end,
U.S. courts agree that one situation in which Article 13(b) is satisfied is when
the child’s return would place him or her in a “zone of war.”
Even though Article 13(b) establishes two alternative bases upon which a
court can refuse to order the return of an abducted child, U.S. courts
traditionally analyze Article 13(b) claims entirely or primarily under the
“grave risk of harm” prong of the defense, ignoring or de-emphasizing the
“intolerable situation” prong. This practice results in an extremely narrow
interpretation of Article 13(b), especially in the zone of war context. For
example, virtually all courts require that the party raising the defense identify
a specific risk of harm directed at the individual child to prove that a zone of
war exists and that the defense is satisfied. This requirement ignores the fact
that a child’s return to a dangerous or unsafe region may expose him or her
to an “intolerable situation” even if the party cannot identify a specific threat
directed at the individual child.

* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Villanova
University. I would like to thank Professor Clare Huntington for her guidance, the Fordham
Law Review editors and staff for their diligence, and my family and friends for their
encouragement, love, and support.
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To protect the children involved in cases under the Convention, this Note
argues that U.S. courts must disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b).
First, the disaggregation of the “grave risk of harm” and “intolerable
situation” prongs is required by the plain meaning of the text of the defense,
the intent of the framers of the Convention, and the purposes of the
Convention itself. Second, disaggregating the two prongs of Article 13(b)
allows zone of war to cover unstable and volatile situations, even if a party
cannot identify a specific threat of danger directed at the individual child
because the limited “intolerable situation” case law allows courts to
consider the environment to which a child will be returned. As such, fully
analyzing both prongs of Article 13(b) allows U.S. courts to better fulfill their
obligations under the Convention and better defend children, a particularly
defenseless population.
INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 2621
I. THE CONVENTION’S FORMATION, GOALS, AND MAJOR PROVISIONS
............................................................................................. 2624
A. Formation of the Convention .......................................... 2624
B. Objectives of the Convention .......................................... 2626
C. Necessary Requirements for a Child’s Case to Fall
Within the Purview of the Convention .......................... 2627
D. Elements of a Hague Case ............................................. 2629
II. ARTICLE 13(B): DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND CURRENT
INTERPRETATION.................................................................. 2631
A. Definition and Scope of Article 13(b) ............................. 2631
B. Current Interpretation of Article 13(b) by U.S.
Courts ........................................................................... 2633
III. U.S. COURTS SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO ANALYZE BOTH
PRONGS OF ARTICLE 13(B) .................................................. 2637
A. Traditional Application of Article 13(b) in the Zone
of War Context .............................................................. 2638
B. The Failure to Disaggregate the Two Prongs of Article
13(b) and Acknowledge That the Defense Has Two
Alternative Bases upon Which to Refuse Return .......... 2640
C. Plausible Challenges to Disaggregating the Prongs of
Article 13(b) and Creating a Broader Definition of
Zone of War .................................................................. 2641
IV. THE TWO PRONGS OF ARTICLE 13(B) SHOULD BE
DISAGGREGATED TO ALLOW ZONE OF WAR TO COVER
UNSAFE AND UNSTABLE SITUATIONS.................................. 2643
A. U.S. Courts Must Disaggregate the Two Prongs of
Article 13(b) to Better Serve the Text and Purposes
of the Convention .......................................................... 2643

2020]

HAGUE CONVENTION ARTICLE 13(B)

2621

1. Disaggregating “Grave Risk of Harm” and
“Intolerable Situation” Is Required by the Text
of Article 13(b) ........................................................ 2643
2. The Framers of the Convention Intended the Two
Prongs of Article 13(b) to Be Separate and
Distinct .................................................................... 2644
3. Disaggregating the Two Prongs of Article 13(b)
Better Serves the Overarching Purposes of the
Convention .............................................................. 2645
B. A Broader Definition of Zone of War ............................. 2645
1. The Limited “Intolerable Situation” Case Law
Allows Courts to Consider the Environment to
Which a Child Will Be Returned ............................ 2645
2. The Application of the Principles Identified from
the Limited “Intolerable Situation” Case Law to
the Zone of War Context ......................................... 2647
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 2648
INTRODUCTION
One of the “most difficult and heart-rending tasks” a judge faces is
deciding whether to return an abducted child to his or her state of habitual
residence under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction1 (the “Convention”) when a party raises an Article 13(b)
defense.2 An Article 13(b) defense asserts that a child faces a “grave risk of
harm” or an “intolerable situation” if returned to his or her state of habitual
residence and, if successful, allows the child to remain in the state to which
he or she was wrongfully removed or retained.3 This decision is particularly
challenging given that courts and scholars are now aware of the growing
number of abductions that occur to help and protect children.4
For example, take Gerardo Bahena Gonzalez’s decision to move his four
children from Sinaloa, Mexico to the United States in Bernal v. Gonzalez.5
Amelia Aguilar Bernal and Gonzalez, both Mexican citizens, married in the
1. Opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 (entered into force Dec. 1,
1983) [hereinafter Convention].
2. Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002). “State of habitual residence” is
not defined in the Convention; determining a child’s state of habitual residence is a fact-bound
question for the presiding court, and courts have considered a variety of factors to answer this
question. See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
3. See Convention, supra note 1, at 8.
4. See Christina Piemonte, Comment, International Child Abduction and Courts’
Evolving Considerations in Evaluating the Hague Convention’s Defenses to Return, 22 TUL.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191, 211–12 (2013). Today, a majority of the individuals taking their
children across borders in violation of custody agreements are mothers, many of whom are
fleeing domestic violence. See id. at 198.
5. 923 F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
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United States in 2003 and had four children while living in the United States.6
In 2008, Bernal and Gonzalez moved to Sinaloa with their children and
experienced marital problems, eventually separating in 2010.7 The couple
entered into a valid custody agreement, in which the parties agreed that
Gonzalez would pay Mex$1500 per week in child support and that Gonzalez
would have weekend visitation rights but only within Sinaloa.8 After the
separation, Gonzalez moved back to the United States and followed the
conditions of the custody agreement until on or about March 25, 2011.9 On
that date, Gonzalez picked up his children for his visit and brought them back
to the United States without Bernal’s permission and ultimately settled in
Texas.10
Bernal initiated a Hague Convention proceeding to have the children
returned to Mexico and Gonzalez raised an Article 13(b) defense, arguing
that the children should not be returned.11 To support his claim, Gonzalez
argued that the Article 13(b) defense was satisfied because cartel violence in
Mexico created a zone of war and because the children’s living situation with
Bernal constituted an abusive environment.12 Gonzalez’s contentions
followed the traditional interpretation of Article 13(b), as most U.S. courts
hold that the defense primarily arises in two situations: (1) where the return
of the child would send him or her to a zone of war, famine, or disease; or
(2) in cases of extreme abuse, neglect, or emotional dependence, and the
court in the state of habitual residence is unable or unwilling to provide the
child with the necessary protection.13
To this end, Gonzalez argued that his children’s return to Mexico would
expose them to a zone of war because cartel violence was overflowing from

6. See id. at 911.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 911–12.
9. See id. at 912–13.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 913–14.
12. See id. at 920–23. Gonzalez argued that the children’s living situation was abusive
because Bernal did not have a job, keep a clean home, provide the children with clothes or
shoes that fit them, or rid the children of lice. See id. at 922. The court held that this evidence
was not sufficient to satisfy Article 13(b) because it did not show “serious neglect or abuse.”
Id.
13. See Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d
1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Salguero v. Argueta, 256 F. Supp. 3d 630, 636–37 (E.D.N.C.
2017); Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); 1 ANN M.
HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 2:38 (3d ed. 2018);
Ann Laquer Estin, Protecting Child Welfare in Abduction and Asylum Proceedings, 41 N.C.
J. INT’L L. 793, 812 (2016); Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Construction and Application
of Grave Risk of Harm Exception in Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction as Implemented in International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11603(e)(2)(A), 56 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 163 § 3 (2011). But see Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d
1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that, when a party proves that returning a child to his or
her state of habitual residence would expose him or her to a “grave risk of harm,” the court
retains the discretion to deny the petition for return, regardless of the home state’s ability to
protect the child). This Note, however, focuses solely on the interpretation of Article 13(b) in
the zone of war context.
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larger Mexican cities into the small town where his children lived.14
Moreover, Gonzalez stated that he observed dead bodies floating in the river
near his children’s home when he visited them.15 One of Gonzalez’s sons
further testified that, before Gonzalez brought him to the United States, “he
was a passenger in [a car] that was stopped by armed cartel members or
thugs” and “an armed man pointed a gun directly at the driver of the vehicle,
[his] uncle, while . . . his grandmother, and his cousin were in the vehicle.”16
While Gonzalez’s son was unharmed, Gonzalez argued that these
experiences together provided evidence that his children’s return to Mexico
would expose them to a “grave risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation.”17
The court, however, held that Gonzalez failed to establish an Article 13(b)
defense proving that the town in Sinaloa, Mexico was a zone of war.18 While
Gonzalez did demonstrate that “the ongoing violence in Mexico pose[d]
serious risk,” the court concluded that Gonzalez “failed to show that the risk
to the children [was] grave.”19 In its analysis of the defense, the court
focused solely on the “grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b) and did not
analyze the “intolerable situation” prong of the defense, which provides an
independent basis for the court to decline to return a child to his or her state
of habitual residence.20 As such, the court held that Gonzalez could not
satisfy Article 13(b) because he did not identify a specific threat of danger
directed at his individual children.21
The court’s analysis in Bernal is emblematic of how U.S. courts often
analyze zone of war claims, in that they focus solely or primarily on the
“grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b).22 Thus, the party raising the
defense is required to show a specific risk of danger directed at his or her
own children, even though the children may be endangered through exposure
to an “intolerable situation” in the absence of a direct threat.23
This Note analyzes Article 13(b) of the Convention, focusing on cases
where a party contends that the defense is applicable because returning a
14. See Bernal, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21.
15. See id. at 921.
16. Id. Gonzalez’s son, who was not a subject of the proceeding due to his age, explained
that he believed the armed men were “thugs looking for other people traveling in a similar
vehicle.” Id.
17. See id. at 920–21.
18. See id. at 921.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. See id. at 920–21 (explaining that, to satisfy Article 13(b), the party opposing a child’s
return must show that the risk to the child is grave, not just serious, and that the child would
be placed in immediate harm or danger on return).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005); Silverman v. Silverman,
338 F.3d 886, 901 (8th Cir. 2003); Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL
5430369, at *7 (D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2012); Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550–51
(W.D. Tex. 2012); Vazquez v. Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 19, 2011); Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 613–14 (E.D. Va.
2002), aff’d sub nom. Escaf v. Rodriguez, 52 F. App’x 207 (4th Cir. 2002).
23. See Baxter, 423 F.3d at 374; Silverman, 338 F.3d at 901; Sieler, 2012 WL 5430369,
at *7; Castro, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 550–51; Vazquez, 2011 WL 196164, at *5; Hazbun Escaf,
200 F. Supp. 2d at 613–14.
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child to his or her state of habitual residence places the child in a zone of war.
Part I describes the Convention’s creation, objectives, and major provisions.
Part II delves deeper into Article 13(b), defining the defense, outlining its
scope, and explaining how U.S. courts have traditionally interpreted the
defense. Part III analyzes Article 13(b) in the zone of war context, explaining
how U.S. courts have traditionally defined zone of war narrowly by focusing
exclusively or primarily on the “grave risk of harm” prong of the defense
when evaluating such claims. Part IV argues that U.S. courts must
disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b) to be faithful to the plain
meaning of the text of the defense, the intention of the framers of the
Convention, and the overarching purposes of the Convention. This Part
further concludes that fully analyzing both prongs of Article 13(b) allows
U.S. courts to expand the definition of zone of war to include unsafe and
unstable circumstances that would place a child in an “intolerable situation,”
even if a party cannot identify a specific threat of danger directed at the
individual child.
I. THE CONVENTION’S FORMATION, GOALS, AND MAJOR PROVISIONS
The Convention establishes a civil remedy for a left-behind parent seeking
the return of his or her child after the child has been wrongfully removed to
or retained in another state that is also a party to the Convention.24 Part I.A
discusses the formation of the Convention and the factors that led the
international community to address the problem of international child
abductions. Part I.B then analyzes the Convention’s major objectives. Part
I.C describes the necessary requirements for a child’s case to fall within the
purview of the Convention, and Part I.D then explains the elements of a
Hague case.
A. Formation of the Convention
International child abduction first received attention as an issue requiring
an international response in the 1970s because of social, legal, and
technological developments that enabled more international travel and
international marriages.25 At the same time, the institution of marriage was
evolving, as more people were getting divorced and having children outside
of marriage.26 As a result of these developments, the number of international
custody disputes and child abductions increased significantly.27 However, it
was challenging to resolve these disputes, simply because it was difficult to

24. See Piemonte, supra note 4, at 193.
25. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2–3 (1999); Tai Vivatvaraphol, Note, Back to Basics:
Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in International Child Abduction Cases Under the
Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 3330–31 (2009).
26. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 2; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at
3331.
27. See Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3331.
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locate children across international borders.28 In addition, the proceedings
were expensive, lengthy, and complicated—and local and foreign authorities
either did not know how or did not want to assist each other.29 These factors
led to inconsistent and unreliable international child abduction cases,
highlighting the need for an international solution.30
As a result, a Hague special commission was assembled in 1976 to address
the growing concerns regarding international child abductions.31 The special
commission determined that the problem would be dealt with at the
fourteenth session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (the
“Hague Conference”),32 an intergovernmental institution that designs treaties
on a number of topics.33 Adair Dyer, then first secretary of the Hague
Conference, began conducting research to understand the nature of the
problem and to prepare for the conference.34 The special commission met in
March of 1979 to discuss the progress of this research and agreed on several
principles that would later provide the foundation for the first draft of the
Convention.35
Using these foundational principles, the Convention in its current form was
prepared during the fourteenth session of the Hague Conference.36 The
twenty-three countries present at the conference, including the United States,
unanimously adopted the Convention on October 25, 1980.37 The
Convention entered into force on December 1, 1983, after it was ratified by
France, Canada, and Portugal.38

28. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 3; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at
3331.
29. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 3; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at
3331.
30. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 3; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at
3332.
31. See Andrew A. Zashin, Bus Bombings and a Baby’s Custody: Insidious Victories for
Terrorism in the Context of International Custody Disputes, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW.
121, 123 (2008).
32. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 17; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at
3333.
33. JAMES D. GARBOLINO, THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 9 (2d ed. 2015).
34. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 17; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at
3333–34.
35. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 19. One of the foundational principles
that the special commission agreed on was that a state could refuse to order the return of a
child if a court in the state where the child was located determined that the return would be
“gravely prejudicial to the child’s interests.” Id.
36. See id. at 22–23. The Hague Conference was held from October 6 to October 25,
1980, in The Hague, Netherlands. Id.; see also Stephanie Vullo, The Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Commencing a Proceeding in New York
for the Return of a Child Abducted from a Foreign Nation, 14 TOURO L. REV. 199, 201 (1997);
Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3334.
37. See Theresa A. Spinillo, Note, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of
International Child Abduction: An Analysis of the Grave Risk of Harm Defense, 14 N.Y. INT’L
L. REV. 129, 130 (2001); Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3334.
38. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 9.
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Although the United States adopted the Convention on October 25, 1980,
the Convention did not become effective as a matter of U.S. domestic law
until April 29, 1988,39 when Congress passed the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act40 (ICARA), which established the procedures
necessary to execute the Convention in the United States.41 The United
States ratified the Convention at The Hague on the same day that Congress
passed ICARA, and the Convention officially went into force for the United
States on July 1, 1988.42
The Convention has resulted in over 150 appellate decisions and three
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court since its inception in the United States.43
Further, as the world progressively globalizes, the number of Hague cases
filed worldwide also continues to increase.44
B. Objectives of the Convention
The Convention’s primary objective is to prevent the abduction of children
across international borders in an attempt to obtain a benefit or advantage in
a custody matter.45 The Convention aims to protect children internationally
from the adverse consequences of being wrongfully removed or retained, to
create procedures that ensure a child’s prompt return to his or her state of
habitual residence, and to secure protection for rights of access.46 The
39. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3339. It took time for the Convention to take effect
in the United States because the U.S. Constitution requires the Senate to ratify treaties, and
Congress must pass legislation to make non-self-executing treaties, such as the Convention,
domestic law. These political processes thus require a significant amount of time and effort.
See Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, and the Need for Availability of Counsel for All
Petitioners, FAM. L.Q., Spring 1990, at 35, 37–38; Vivatvaraphol, supra note 25, at 3339–40,
3340 n.119; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 203–04 (“In order to be bound by the Convention,
a signatory must enact a domestic law that adopts the treaty and provides for its execution.”).
40. 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2018).
41. ICARA grants concurrent original jurisdiction to state and federal courts to hear cases
that arise under the Convention. See Veronica Torrez et al., The International Abduction of
International Children: Conflicts of Laws, Federal Statutes, and Judicial Interpretation of
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 5 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 7, 32 (2005); Vullo, supra note 36, at 204.
42. See Pfund, supra note 39, at 38. There are currently 101 signatories to the Convention.
See 28: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24 [https://
perma.cc/Q6ZU-62XH] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
43. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at vii.
44. See id. at xvii–xviii. To be more specific, the U.S. Department of State received 334
applications for return from signatory nations in 2013, 352 applications for return from
signatory nations in 2014, and opened 427 new Hague cases in 2018. See id. at 1; see also
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INCOMING HAGUE CONVENTION CASES TO THE U.S. CENTRAL
AUTHORITY (2018), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/NEWIPCAAssets/pdfs/Incoming%
20Data%20Page%20-%202019%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X2L-FR2N].
The State Department is responsible for executing the duties imposed by the Convention in
the United States. See infra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
45. See Farrell, supra note 13, § 2.
46. See Convention, supra note 1, at 4; SARAH VIGERS, MEDIATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION CASES: THE HAGUE CONVENTION 7 (2011); Laura W. Morgan, “Grave Risk of
Harm” Under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: What
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Convention is a civil remedy designed to promptly return an abducted child
to his or her state of habitual residence and allow the local authorities to
resolve the custody dispute.47
The framers of the Convention were also “firmly convinced that the
interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their
custody.”48 The apparent disparity between these different objectives, with
one prioritizing the efficient resolution of Hague cases and the other
emphasizing the importance of considering the child’s best interests, has
confused courts, especially in the context of Article 13(b).49 As a result of
this confusion, some courts believe that the Convention’s primary goals are
to ensure an abducted child’s prompt return to his or her state of habitual
residence and prevent parties from forum shopping in international custody
disputes, while other courts believe that the Convention’s goal is to protect
the safety and well-being of the child in question.50
C. Necessary Requirements for a Child’s Case to Fall Within the Purview
of the Convention
For a party to be able to bring a Hague case: (1) the child in question must
be below the age of sixteen and “habitually resident” in a contracting state to
the Convention immediately prior to the breach of custody or access rights;
(2) the person with whom the child had been residing must have actually been
exercising custody rights at the time of the wrongful removal or retention;
(3) the Convention must have “entered into force” between the two states
involved before the party filed the application for the child’s return; and (4)
the child’s wrongful removal or retention must have happened after the
Convention became effective in both states.51
Constitutes a War?, DIVORCE LITIG., July 2002, at 133, 133. The Convention defines “rights
of access” as “the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the
child’s habitual residence.” Convention, supra note 1, at 5.
47. See Torrez et al., supra note 41, at 8; see also GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 6
(explaining that the Convention is not concerned with “the entry, modification, or enforcement
of foreign or domestic child custody orders”); Vullo, supra note 36, at 201–02 (clarifying that
the Convention is designed to determine a child’s state of habitual residence and allow the
courts of that state to decide the custody dispute). As the Convention is a civil remedy, it is
not an extradition treaty and does not criminalize the wrongful removal or retention of a child.
See id. at 203.
48. Convention, supra note 1, at 4.; see also Piemonte, supra note 4, at 210; Kyle
Simpson, Comment, What Constitutes a “Grave Risk of Harm?”: Lowering the Hague Child
Abduction Convention’s Article 13(b) Evidentiary Burden to Protect Domestic Violence
Victims, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 841, 842 (2017) (“[T]he drafters made clear at the beginning
of the document that the Convention’s ultimate purpose is to protect the interests and safety
of the child.”).
49. See Simpson, supra note 48, at 843.
50. See id. For more information on the apparent conflict between these competing
objectives, especially in the context of Article 13(b), and how the best interests of the child
should influence an Article 13(b) analysis, see infra notes 157–61, 192–95 and accompanying
text.
51. See Convention, supra note 1, at 5; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 17–18; VIGERS,
supra note 46, at 7; Zashin, supra note 31, at 123. Whether or not the Convention is “in force”
between states depends on whether the states in question are “member states” or “party states.”
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If these conditions are met, a party can request the return of a wrongfully
removed or retained child through either an administrative request filed with
the “central authority”52 of the state where the child is located or the state of
the left-behind parent or a court proceeding.53 These procedures are not
mutually exclusive—a party can choose to apply both to the central authority
and to a court for the child’s return.54 One factor that a party should consider
is that, while the central authority can negotiate for the child’s return with the
parties involved, it has no power to compel the child’s return.55 As such, in
the United States, if these negotiations fail, the party must file an application
with the federal district court or state court with jurisdiction where the child
is located and have the court compel the child’s return through a court
order.56 Regardless of the procedure chosen, however, the party must initiate
the proceeding within the Convention’s one-year statute of limitations.57
Importantly, upon the receipt of a Convention petition for return in any
U.S. court, any ongoing state court custody matter must be placed on hold
while the court that received the petition decides whether the proceeding has
been brought in the correct jurisdiction.58 If the state court custody
proceeding is not stayed, a federal court may vacate its determination.59

GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 17–18. “Member states” are states that were participants in the
Hague Conference, and they become bound by the Convention after they ratify it. Id. at 18.
On the other hand, “party states” did not participate in the Hague Conference when the
Convention was approved for adoption, and they must accede to the Convention to become
bound by it. Id. When a member state ratifies the Convention, the Convention automatically
enters into force between that member state and all other member states who have ratified the
Convention. Id. On the other hand, for the Convention to enter into force between a member
state and a party state after the member state ratifies the Convention, the member state must
specifically accept the party state’s accession. Id. A party state who has previously acceded
to the Convention must also expressly accept the accession of a new party state to the
Convention for it to enter into force between them. Id.
52. All members of the Convention are required to designate a central authority that
discharges the duties imposed by the Convention; the Office of Children’s Issues in the Bureau
of Consular Affairs in the Department of State is the central authority in the United States. See
GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 11; Vullo, supra note 36, at 208–09.
53. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 21.
54. See Vullo, supra note 36, at 210.
55. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 21.
56. See id.; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 210. Federal and state courts in the United
States have concurrent original jurisdiction in Hague cases, and a party can choose to initiate
the court proceeding in any court “which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place
where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (2018).
57. See Vullo, supra note 36, at 224. See infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the Convention’s statute of limitations.
58. See Convention, supra note 1, at 9; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 5; Galit Moskowitz,
The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction and the Grave Risk of Harm
Exception: Recent Decisions and Their Implications on Children from Nations in Political
Turmoil, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 580, 582 (2003).
59. See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n.55 (9th Cir. 2001); GARBOLINO, supra
note 33, at 6.
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D. Elements of a Hague Case
The Convention’s structure is straightforward. After a court determines
that a child below the age of sixteen has been wrongfully removed from or
retained outside of his or her state of habitual residence, it must order the
child’s immediate return unless the respondent satisfies one of the defenses
available under the Convention.60
For the purposes of the Convention, the removal or retention of a child is
wrongful where “(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a
person . . . under the law of the State in which the child was habitually
resident immediately before the removal or retention” and (b) those rights of
custody were being exercised at the time of the removal or retention or they
would have been so exercised if the removal or retention had not occurred.61
In this analysis, “rights of custody” are determined by reference to the law of
the state where the child was habitually resident immediately prior to the
wrongful removal or retention,62 and “custody rights” are defined as more
than “mere visitation or ‘access’ rights.”63
The determination of habitual residence is central to a Hague case, as a
child’s removal or retention is only wrongful if he or she is removed from or
retained outside of his or her state of habitual residence.64 This is a factdriven inquiry, and courts consider factors such as “language issues, how
well the child has acclimated to his or her new environment, the intentions of
the child’s parents, the time that the child was physically located in a
particular place, and personal issues, such as medical care, schooling, social
life, extended family, friends, and age” to decide which state is considered
the child’s habitual residence.65 The relative importance of these factors
varies depending on whether the court prioritizes parental intent or child
experiences in its habitual residence determination.66 Under both of these

60. See Estin, supra note 13, at 806; Piemonte, supra note 4, at 193. ICARA requires that
the petitioning party prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is under sixteen
years of age, that the child was wrongfully removed from or retained outside of his or her state
of habitual residence, and that this removal or retention violated the party’s custody rights.
See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 23–24. The petitioner, however, has
to provide only preliminary evidence to establish that his or her custody rights were being
exercised. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 24. For further discussion of the defenses
available under the Convention, see infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
61. Convention, supra note 1, at 5; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 213 (“A removal or
retention is wrongful under . . . the Convention if it breaches the custody rights of a person or
institution as defined by the laws of the child’s habitual residence, and that at the time of the
removal or retention, those rights were being exercised or would have been exercised but for
the removal or retention.”).
62. See Convention, supra note 1, at 4–5; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 7.
63. Radu v. Toader, 463 F. App’x 29, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2012); see also GARBOLINO, supra
note 33, at 30.
64. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 50; see also Vullo, supra note 36, at 213 (explaining
that “establishing the child’s habitual residence is the cornerstone of a successful return
petition”).
65. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 51 (collecting cases).
66. See id. at 53. While the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
prioritize parental intent in their habitual residence determinations, the Sixth Circuit focuses
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approaches, however, the court focuses on the length of time the child has
lived in the state and whether there are objective facts that establish the state
as the child’s habitual residence.67
When a court determines that a child has been wrongfully removed from
or retained outside of his or her state of habitual residence, the courts of the
state where the child is located must order the immediate return of the child,
as long as the party requesting the return commences the proceedings within
one year of the date of the wrongful removal or retention and no other
defenses available under the Convention apply.68
The Convention’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run from the
date of the wrongful conduct.69 A party must file an action in court to
commence the proceedings;70 an application to the central authority is not
sufficient to stop the clock.71 Even if the party requesting the child’s return
misses this deadline, however, the courts of the state where the child is
located should still order the child’s return unless the responding party
demonstrates that the child is well settled in his or her new home.72 In this
context, “settled” has been understood to mean “that the child has significant
emotional and physical connections demonstrating security, stability, and
permanence in its new environment.”73

on the child’s experiences, and the Third and Eighth Circuits combine both of these
approaches. See LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 15:25 (2019).
67. See Piemonte, supra note 4, at 193. In its most recent decision regarding the
Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the habitual residence determination is
a fact-driven inquiry, holding that “there are no categorical requirements for establishing a
child’s habitual residence” and that an agreement between an infant’s parents is not necessary
to establish the infant’s habitual residence under the Convention when he or she is too young
to acclimate to his or her surroundings. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 728 (2020).
68. See Convention, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 12
(explaining that if a child is not returned to his or her state of habitual residence in under six
weeks, authorities can be asked to explain the delay).
69. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 27–28. When the child is wrongfully removed, the
statute of limitations starts running on the day the party unilaterally takes the child from his
or her state of habitual residence without the other parent’s knowledge or permission. Id. at
27. When a child is wrongfully retained, the period begins either on the date the abducting
parent fails to return the child, despite the left-behind parent’s clear wish to have the child
returned, or when the abducting parent’s actions are so apparent that the left-behind parent
knows, or reasonably should know, that the abducting parent is not returning the child. Id.
70. See Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (E.D. Wash. 2007);
GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 94.
71. See Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 418–19 (E.D. Mich. 1997); GARBOLINO,
supra note 33, at 94.
72. See Vullo, supra note 36, at 212. Factors to consider in deciding whether a child is
“settled in its new environment” include: the child’s age, the stability of the child’s residence
and the parent’s employment, whether the child has friends and relatives in the area, whether
the child attends school or church consistently, and whether the child participates in
extracurricular activities. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom.
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1 (2014).
73. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 56.
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II. ARTICLE 13(B): DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND CURRENT INTERPRETATION
Article 13(b) is the most frequently cited defense available under the
Convention that allows a court to refuse to order the return of an abducted
child to his or her state of habitual residence.74 Part II.A defines Article
13(b), outlines its scope, and explains what evidence courts are allowed to
consider when analyzing the defense. Part II.B describes the current
interpretation of Article 13(b) by U.S. courts and identifies the circumstances
where there is a consensus regarding its applicability. It then explores the
court-created concept of undertakings, a unique aspect of the current
application of the defense.
A. Definition and Scope of Article 13(b)
The Convention identifies several defenses to the immediate return of a
child who is wrongfully removed from or retained outside of his or her state
of habitual residence.75 As the most commonly used of these defenses,
Article 13(b) is often considered the most important defense available under
the Convention.76 It stipulates that a state is not bound to order the return of
an abducted child if the party opposing the child’s return shows that “there is
a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”77
Importantly, a party raising Article 13(b) must prove the defense by clear and
convincing evidence.78

74. See Anastacia M. Greene, Seen and Not Heard?: Children’s Objections Under the
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
105, 116 (2005); Sharon C. Nelson, Note, Turning Our Backs on the Children: Implications
of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 676; Piemonte, supra note 4, at 211.
75. See Convention, supra note 1, at 7–9. In addition to Article 13(b), the Convention
also provides that courts are not obligated to order the return of a child if: (1) “the person . . .
having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the
time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal
or retention”; (2) the child objects to the return and it is appropriate to consider his or her
opinion because of his or her age and maturity; (3) the return “would not be permitted by the
fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms”; or (4) the petitioning party missed the one year statute of limitations
and the child is “settled” in his or her new environment. Id. These defenses are all fascinating
areas of research, but they are outside the scope of this Note.
76. See Greene, supra note 74, at 116; Nelson, supra note 74, at 676; Piemonte, supra
note 4, at 211.
77. Convention, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added). When U.S. courts address Article
13(b), they consider it to be a mixed question of fact and law, and they review it de novo on
appeal. See Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 896 (8th Cir. 2003); GARBOLINO, supra
note 33, at 109.
78. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A) (2018); Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907, 919
(W.D. Tex. 2012); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 87. ICARA likely requires Article 13(b) to
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, not by a preponderance of the evidence, because
of the stereotype of abductors at the time Congress passed ICARA. See generally Simpson,
supra note 48. When Congress passed ICARA, it believed most child abductors were foreignborn fathers who took the children of American women back to their home countries. See id.
at 847. Thus, Congress wanted to ensure that it would not be too easy for these fathers to
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Article 13(b), like all of the Convention’s defenses, is construed
narrowly,79 as there is “an overriding preference” to return a wrongfully
removed or retained child to his or her state of habitual residence.80 To this
end, two international studies conducted in 1999 and 2003 showed that 74
percent of Hague cases that went to court in 1999 and 79 percent of Hague
cases that went to court in 2003 resulted in the court ordering the child’s
return.81 Along the same lines, U.S. courts rarely find that an Article 13(b)
defense has been proven.82 The defense is infrequently successful because
courts have interpreted it narrowly and imposed a heightened burden of proof
out of a fear that it would be exploited by parents attempting to forum shop
in international custody disputes.83 Moreover, even if all of the conditions
for a defense under the Convention are met, a court can still exercise its
discretion and choose to return the child to his or her state of habitual
residence if doing so would advance the aims of the Convention.84 This
policy also originates from the desire to interpret the defenses narrowly so
that they do not undermine the Convention’s objective of promptly returning
abducted children to their states of habitual residence.85
Due to the narrow construction of Article 13(b), courts cannot consider
information that would be proper in a plenary custody hearing,86 engage in a
custody determination, or address who would be the better parent in an
Article 13(b) analysis.87 Even so, the court must allow the party raising an
argue that returning the child to his or her mother would expose him or her to a “grave risk of
harm” or an “intolerable situation.” See id.
79. See Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 2010); Bernal, 923 F. Supp.
2d at 919; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 88; Farrell, supra note 13, § 8.
80. Zashin, supra note 31, at 125.
81. See VIGERS, supra note 46, at 7–8.
82. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 140; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13,
§ 2:38.
83. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 140; Hague Conference on Private
International Law: Report of the Second Special Commission Meeting to Review the
Operation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33
I.L.M. 225, 241 (1994) (“Most experts reported that in their jurisdictions Article 13 b is given
a very narrow interpretation and that therefore few defences based upon this argument are
successful.”); see also Estin, supra note 13, at 808 (explaining that Article 13(b) is interpreted
narrowly out of fear that it will swallow the Convention’s general rule to promptly return an
abducted child to his or her state of habitual residence and because the defense must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence).
84. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221 n.17 (1st Cir. 2000); Friedrich v. Friedrich,
78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 89; Estin, supra note 13, at
808. For further explanation of how U.S. courts use undertakings to implement this policy,
see infra notes 108–26 and accompanying text.
85. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51
Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509–10 (Mar. 26, 1986).
86. See Farrell, supra note 13, § 2; see also Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843,
850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that evidence relevant to a custody proceeding is not
appropriate in an Article 13(b) hearing).
87. See Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 459 (1st Cir. 2000); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY,
supra note 25, at 140–41; see also ELROD, supra note 66, § 15:30 (“Psychological profiles,
detailed evaluations of parental fitness, evidence concerning lifestyle and the nature and
quality of relationships all bear upon the ultimate issue and should be determined by the
appropriate tribunal in the place of habitual residence.”).
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Article 13(b) defense the opportunity to submit evidence, including expert
testimony, that supports the defense, as well as the opportunity to question
the petitioner’s witnesses.88 In addition, the relevant authority must consider
any information that the government of the child’s habitual residence
provides about the child’s social background.89 Importantly, courts must
consider the existence of a “grave risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation”
at the time the petition is heard—not at some unidentifiable point in the
future.90
B. Current Interpretation of Article 13(b) by U.S. Courts
Since its inception, courts and scholars have found it challenging to define
the scope of Article 13(b).91 Reports from the Hague Conference do not
clarify the purview of the defense, as they acknowledge that the exact
phrasing of Article 13(b) was the result of a delicate compromise among the
participating states but otherwise provide no guidance on its interpretation.92
Despite this, U.S. courts agree that Article 13(b) is primarily available in
two situations: (1) where the return of the child would send him or her to a
zone of war, famine, or disease; and (2) in cases of extreme abuse, neglect,
or emotional dependence where the state of habitual residence is unable or
unwilling to provide the child with the necessary protection.93 Using this
framework, U.S. courts have held that the defense is not satisfied in cases of
poverty, unfavorable living conditions, or limited educational
opportunities.94 Further, most courts agree that the defense similarly fails
when the abducting party asserts that the return of the child will result in
88. See Noergaard v. Noergaard, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 559–60 (Ct. App. 2015);
HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.
89. See Convention, supra note 1, at 8.
90. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 141.
91. Estin, supra note 13, at 811.
92. See id.; see also Explanatory Report by Elisa Pérez-Vera, in 3 CONFÉRENCE DE LA
HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ: ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION
426, 461 (1982) (“Each of the terms used in [Article 13(b)] is the result of a fragile
compromise reached during the deliberations of the Special Commission and has been kept
unaltered. Thus it cannot be inferred, a contrario, from the rejection during the Fourteenth
Session of proposals favouring the inclusion of an express provision stating that this exception
could not be invoked if the return of the child might harm its economic or educational
prospects, that the exceptions are to receive a wide interpretation.” (footnote omitted)).
93. See Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d
1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Salguero v. Argueta, 256 F. Supp. 3d 630, 636–37 (E.D.N.C.
2017); Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); HARALAMBIE,
supra note 13, § 2:38; Estin, supra note 13, at 812; Farrell, supra note 13, § 3. But see Baran
v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that when a party proves that returning
a child to his or her state of habitual residence would expose him or her to a “grave risk of
harm,” the court has the discretion to deny the petition for return, regardless of the home state’s
ability to protect the child).
94. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364–65 (M.D. Fla.
2002); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 136; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 111;
see also Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that homes without
running water or indoor plumbing do not satisfy Article 13(b) because “[b]illions of people
live in” comparable environments).
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psychological harm to the child because of his or her separation from the
abductor.95 The harm to the child must be greater than what is normally to
be expected when a child is taken away from one parent and passed to another
parent.96 Recent case law also clarifies that the physical, sexual, or emotional
abuse of a child by a parent satisfies an Article 13(b) defense.97
Domestic violence sometimes constitutes a “grave risk of harm” or an
“intolerable situation” that satisfies Article 13(b).98 Some courts require that
the child himself or herself be a direct victim of the abuse for the defense to
be met,99 while other courts allow the defense even if the child was not the
subject of the abuse.100 Commentators contend that this split exists because
the term “domestic violence” is “all-inclusive” and encompasses “minor and
isolated incidents on one end and high degrees of lethality and death on the
other.”101
In Simcox v. Simcox,102 the Sixth Circuit categorized different levels of
domestic violence and explained how these categories relate to an Article
13(b) analysis. For example, when the abuse is “relatively minor,” the court
held that Article 13(b) is likely not satisfied.103 On the other hand, when the
violence is severe, with evidence of sexual abuse or death threats, Article
13(b) is almost certainly satisfied, and the court should deny the petition for
return unless it is sure that the children will be protected when they arrive in
their states of habitual residence.104 For situations that fall in between these
two extremes, the court must conduct a fact-driven inquiry to decide whether
the defense is satisfied, considering the frequency of the violence, the
likelihood that the abuse will recur, and whether the court can implement any
95. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000); Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d
369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995); Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1364; GARBOLINO, supra note 33,
at 112.
96. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 218. This is true because, to satisfy Article 13(b), the risk to the
child must be grave, not just serious. See Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 607–08 (6th Cir.
2007).
97. See Baran, 526 F.3d at 1352; Danaipour v. McLarey 286 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2002);
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg.
10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 113; Piemonte, supra note 4, at
196. In this analysis, courts consider the sexual and physical abuse of a child to be equally
harmful. See Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123, at *17 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 16, 2000); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (D. Md. 1999); James
Alfieri, Trauma, Recovery, and Transnational Child Abduction: Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder as Psychological Harm Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 5 OR. REV. INT’L L. 40, 48 (2003).
98. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.
99. See Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 2000); McManus v. McManus, 354
F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D. Mass. 2005); Aldinger v. Segler, 263 F. Supp. 2d 284, 289 (D.P.R.
2003); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114; see also Estin, supra note 13, at 813 (explaining
that many courts have held that domestic violence, especially when directed at children,
satisfies Article 13(b)).
100. See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219–21; Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553–55
(E.D. Pa. 2010); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114–15.
101. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 114.
102. 511 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2007).
103. Id. at 607.
104. See id. at 607–08.
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conditions to adequately protect the children.105 As such, domestic violence
is most likely to satisfy Article 13(b) when the abuse is extreme and the court
does not believe that any undertakings can properly protect the child.106
Undertakings are conditions implemented to protect the child until the
custody matter is resolved in the child’s state of habitual residence.107
To this end, one particularly unique aspect of how U.S. courts currently
interpret Article 13(b) is the use of undertakings.108 There is a circuit split
over the correct course of action a court should take once it determines that
a “grave risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation” exists.109 After the court
decides that Article 13(b) is satisfied, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits
require the court to consider whether ameliorative measures exist that can
nevertheless allow the court to order the return of the child.110 On the other
hand, the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that a court may consider
whether there are alternatives that allow the court to order the return of a
child but that the court is not required to examine such alternatives.111
Regardless of whether the consideration is required or discretionary, virtually
all U.S. courts now consider “the full panoply of arrangements that might
allow the children to be returned” to their state of habitual residence after an
Article 13(b) defense has been recognized.112 However, the Convention does
not require this analysis,113 and the additional step makes it more
burdensome to raise the defense.114
After considering the ameliorative measures, a court may order a child’s
return with undertakings. A nonexhaustive list of undertakings includes:
105. See id. at 608.
106. See id.
107. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38. Undertakings can also be defined as
“promises offered, or in certain instances imposed upon, an applicant to overcome obstacles
which may stand in the way of the return of a wrongfully removed or retained child.”
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 158. Undertakings are most frequently used in
common-law states. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137.
108. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137–47.
109. See Estin, supra note 13, at 813.
110. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 395–96 (3d Cir. 2006); Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d
240, 248 (2d Cir. 1999); Luis Ischiu v. Gomez Garcia, 274 F. Supp. 3d 339, 354–55 (D. Md.
2017); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 143.
111. See Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346–52 (11th Cir. 2008); Simcox, 511 F.3d at
608; Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 303 (1st Cir. 2004); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at
143.
112. Blondin, 189 F.3d at 242. The court further held that “it is important that a court
considering an exception under Article 13(b) take into account any ameliorative measures (by
the parents and by the authorities of the state having jurisdiction over the question of custody)
that can reduce whatever risk might otherwise be associated with a child’s repatriation.” Id. at
248. Interestingly, a few courts have held that undertakings are appropriate even when an
Article 13(b) defense has not been established as a way to ensure that the child is safely
returned. See Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2008); Wilchynski v. Wilchynski,
No. 3:10-CV-63-FKB, 2010 WL 1068070, at *8–11 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2010); Krefter v.
Wills, 623 F. Supp. 2d 125, 136–38 (D. Mass. 2009).
113. See Estin, supra note 13, at 813; see also Simpson, supra note 48, at 861 (explaining
that “there is no authority for the use of undertakings in the Convention’s language”).
114. See Hannah Loo, Comment, In the Child’s Best Interests: Examining International
Child Abduction, Adoption, and Asylum, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 609, 620 (2017).

2636

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

requiring the petitioner to allow reasonable visitation by the other parent after
the child’s return, ensuring that the petitioner does not seek an order that
requires the child to be removed from his or her primary caretaker before the
final custody determination, requiring the petitioner to pay the cost of
transportation back to the state of habitual residence or provide monetary
support for a period of time, and ensuring that the child is returned under the
supervision of the nonoffending parent or a third party when there have been
reports of child abuse or domestic violence.115 Courts can tailor specific
undertakings to each individual case.116 Moreover, a petitioner sometimes
offers to provide certain undertakings in connection with the return because
he or she believes the court will be more agreeable to the petition.117
Proponents contend that undertakings are justified because courts retain
discretion to order the return of an abducted child even if a defense is
satisfied, as long as the return furthers the goals of the Convention.118 In this
sense, those who support undertakings see them as a compromise that
balances the Convention’s goals of promptly returning an abducted child,
preventing forum shopping in international custody disputes, and protecting
the child’s best interests.119 Advocates for undertakings believe in the
fairness and impartiality of the authorities in the other signatories to the
Convention and trust that they will honor the undertakings.120
Critics of undertakings are wary of the protective conditions because there
is no remedy if the petitioner violates an undertaking after the child is
returned to his or her state of habitual residence, as the court that ordered the
undertaking no longer has jurisdiction over the case.121 In other words, the
state to which the child is returned dictates whether undertakings are

115. See Blondin, 189 F.3d at 248; Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 976 (Conn. 2000);
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 158–59; GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137, 142–
43; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38. One restriction that courts have placed on
undertakings is that they cannot be too “unrealistic” or “onerous,” such as undertakings that
are beyond the control of the party who has to execute them. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at
140–41. An example of such an undertaking is requiring the petitioner to prove that the
criminal charges against the respondent in the state of habitual residence have been dismissed
and that the respondent is under no threat of prosecution if he or she returns. See Maurizio R.
v. L.C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93, 115 (Ct. App. 2011). Whether the respondent is liable for
criminal charges is subject to the discretion of the state of his or her habitual residence and is
not within the petitioner’s control. See id.
116. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 159.
117. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137. Voluntary undertakings also “provide some
comfort for the abductor and child” and make the return to the state of habitual residence
easier. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 164.
118. See Simpson, supra note 48, at 861–62.
119. See id.
120. See Jeanine Lewis, Comment, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: When Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Impact the Goal
of Comity, 13 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 391, 428 (2000); Piemonte, supra note 4, at 203; see also
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 170 (acknowledging that the enforcement of
undertakings depends on “goodwill”).
121. See Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d
204, 221 (1st Cir. 2000); HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38; Piemonte, supra note 4, at 202;
Simpson, supra note 48, at 861.
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enforced.122 To this end, one scholar argues that, after an Article 13(b)
defense has been proven, children should not be returned to their states of
habitual residence unless local authorities are aware of this fact and are
willing and able to protect the child.123
Courts can mitigate this enforceability problem by structuring
undertakings so that they must be performed before the child is returned to
his or her state of habitual residence.124 For example, if one of the
undertakings requires the petitioner to pay for the child’s transportation back
to his or her state of habitual residence, the court can further stipulate that the
respondent receive that payment before the return occurs.125
Despite the enforceability issue, undertakings are now an accepted part of
an Article 13(b) analysis, and U.S. courts use them to condition a child’s
return to his or her state of habitual residence on certain protective measures
after they have held that the defense has been satisfied.126
III. U.S. COURTS SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO ANALYZE BOTH PRONGS OF
ARTICLE 13(B)
U.S. courts consistently administer an incredibly narrow legal
interpretation of Article 13(b), especially in the zone of war context. This
interpretation is driven primarily by the courts’ failure to analyze both the
“grave risk of harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs of the defense. Part
III.A further analyzes the typical application of Article 13(b) in the zone of
war context. It demonstrates through case law that U.S. courts have
traditionally rejected the zone of war argument in Hague cases and evaluate
such claims only or primarily under the “grave risk of harm” prong of the
defense. Part III.B explores the rejection of the “intolerable situation” prong
of Article 13(b) by U.S. courts. Part III.C responds to potential objections to
broadening the scope of Article 13(b) and argues that critics misunderstand

122. Lewis, supra note 120, at 428; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at
161 (reiterating that there is no guarantee that undertakings will be enforced in the child’s state
of habitual residence); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 139 (explaining that undertakings
designed to be performed in the child’s state of habitual residence are unenforceable because
courts have no obligation to honor promises made to foreign courts). This enforceability issue
is particularly problematic in cases of domestic violence and child abuse because, if
unenforced, the undertaking does nothing to protect against continued violence and abuse. See
Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2005); HARALAMBIE, supra note
13, § 2:38; Estin, supra note 13, at 813; see also Simpson, supra note 48, at 861 (explaining
that undertakings “open the door for the abuser to continue to manipulate and control the
abductor” in domestic violence situations).
123. See Estin, supra note 13, at 831; see also Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.
2008) (holding that an undertaking is reversible if it is “insufficient to mitigate [the] grave risk
of harm” that has been established); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 165 (arguing
that if Article 13(b) is satisfied, the court should not decide to return the child unless it can
guarantee the enforcement of the undertakings).
124. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 139–40.
125. See id. at 140.
126. See id. at 143; see also Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1999);
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 158; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.
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the overarching purposes of the Convention and overstate the potential for
Article 13(b) to be misused.
A. Traditional Application of Article 13(b) in the Zone of War Context
U.S. courts agree that one of the two situations in which Article 13(b) may
be raised is when returning a child to his or her state of habitual residence
will place him or her in a zone of war.127 Limiting Article 13(b) in this way
makes the defense extremely narrow and “goes well beyond the text and
history of the Convention.”128 This is especially true because, when
assessing a zone of war claim, U.S. courts only or primarily analyze the
“grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b) and ignore or de-emphasize the
“intolerable situation” prong of the defense.129 To this end, most courts
require that the party raising an Article 13(b) defense provide “specific
evidence of potential harm to the child upon his return” to prove that
returning the child to his or her state of habitual residence will place him or
her in a zone of war.130
The following cases provide examples of this traditional application of
zone of war by U.S. courts, showing that they analyze such claims only or
primarily under the “grave risk of harm” prong of Article 13(b) and require
the party raising the defense to identify a specific risk of harm directed at the
individual child in question.131
In Silverman v. Silverman,132 the Eighth Circuit held that Israel did not
constitute a zone of war for purposes of an Article 13(b) defense because
there was no “specific evidence of potential harm to the individual children”
in question.133 The rationale for this decision hinged on the fact that the
“evidence centered on general regional violence, such as suicide bombers,
that threaten everyone in Israel.”134 The court further pointed out that no
other court had found that Israel, or any other state, is a zone of war for
purposes of Article 13(b).135 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit overruled the
district court, which had held that Israel was a zone of war for purposes of
127. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
128. Estin, supra note 13, at 812; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 142
(acknowledging that this conception of Article 13(b) “appear[s] somewhat extreme, almost
ruling out entirely the possibility of the exception being invoked”).
129. See generally Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003); Bernal v.
Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Tex. 2012); Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-MDLC, 2012 WL 5430369 (D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2012); Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546
(W.D. Tex. 2012); Vazquez v. Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2011). But see Avendano v. Smith, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1176 (D.N.M. 2011)
(“Although Mexico is more dangerous than the United States at this time, intolerable situation
was not meant to encompass return to a home where living conditions are less palatable.”).
130. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Silverman, 338 F.3d at
900; Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d sub nom.
Escaf v. Rodriguez, 52 F. App’x 207 (4th Cir. 2002).
131. See supra note 129 (collecting cases).
132. 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003).
133. Id. at 900.
134. Id. at 901.
135. See id.
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the defense because of the escalating violence and deadly bombings near
Ra’anana, the region where the children lived, as well as the U.S. State
Department’s travel warnings for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.136
Cartel cases have spurred furious debate within the district courts, though
the consensus has been that “evidence of general drug cartel violence” does
not satisfy Article 13(b).137 For example, in Castro v. Martinez,138 the court
held that Article 13(b) was not satisfied even though Monterrey, the Mexican
region where the child lived, was under the influence of multiple competing
cartels; the child was fascinated with guns and violence, likely because of his
witnessing of violent acts; and some of petitioner’s relatives were possibly
cartel members.139 In so holding, the court “stressed that the risk of harm
must truly be grave. The respondent must present clear and convincing
evidence of this grave harm [to the individual child] because any more lenient
standard would create a situation where the exception would swallow the
rule.”140
In Rodriguez v. Sieler,141 Sieler raised an Article 13(b) defense because
drug cartel activity had increased violence in Nayarit, the Mexican state
where the children lived.142 Sieler alleged that Nayarit was under military
control because of cartel activity; that dead bodies hung off of overpasses;
that there were random shootings in the area; that his sister-in-law was caught
in a grocery store shooting in which eight people died and many others were
injured; that this same sister-in-law was later robbed at knifepoint in her
house; that the home in which the sister-in-law was robbed was close to the
children’s grandparents’ house where the children spent a lot of time; that his
brother-in-law may be in a cartel; and that there was a “drug house” across
the street from the family’s home.143
However, the court held that the defense was not satisfied because Sieler
proved only “general regional violence”144 and did not identify “specific
evidence of potential harm to the individual children.”145 The court further
held that Sieler’s “sincere but speculative concerns for his children’s
safety . . . do not demonstrate a ‘grave risk’ of ‘immediate’ physical or
psychological harm.”146
136. See Silverman v. Silverman, No. CIV. 00-2274 (JRT), 2002 WL 971808, at *9–10 (D.
Minn. May 9, 2002), rev’d, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003).
137. Estin, supra note 13, at 812–13. See generally Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d
907 (W.D. Tex. 2012); Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 5430369 (D.
Mont. Nov. 7, 2012); Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546 (W.D. Tex. 2012); Vazquez v.
Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011). See supra notes
5–21 and accompanying text for an analysis of Gonzalez’s Article 13(b) claim in Bernal.
138. 872 F. Supp. 2d 546 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
139. See id. at 550–51.
140. Id. at 557 (quoting Norinder v. Fuentes, 657 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 2011)).
141. No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 5430369 (D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2012).
142. See id. at *7.
143. Id. The petitioner claimed that some of the violence alleged by the respondent
occurred a few hours away from the family home. See id.
144. Id. (quoting Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 901 (8th Cir. 2003)).
145. Id. (quoting Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 900 (8th Cir. 2003)).
146. Id. at *8 (quoting Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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Finally, in Vazquez v. Estrada,147 the court held that Estrada had not met
the Article 13(b) standard because he failed to prove that Monterrey, Mexico,
the region where the child lived, was a zone of war, despite evidence of
surging violence and murders in the child’s neighborhood and previous
school.148 The court held that Estrada had “failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that a grave risk of physical harm exists.”149
These cases underscore that U.S. courts have traditionally been unwilling
to recognize a zone of war argument in the Article 13(b) context.150 To this
end, they consistently hold that “evidence of general drug cartel violence”
does not satisfy Article 13(b), even when the evidence shows that a child has
witnessed violence, that his or her relatives are likely involved in a cartel, or
that there are dead bodies floating or hanging in his or her neighborhood.151
B. The Failure to Disaggregate the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) and
Acknowledge That the Defense Has Two Alternative Bases upon Which to
Refuse Return
Even though the “grave risk of harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs
of Article 13(b) can each serve as an independent basis upon which to refuse
to return an abducted child to his or her state of habitual residence, the two
prongs are rarely independently addressed.152 Instead, they are often
“employed collectively as a unified formula.”153 As a result, U.S. courts have
traditionally ignored the “intolerable situation” prong when analyzing Article
13(b) claims.154
Some experts theorize that Article 13(b) has been interpreted in this way
because of a U.S. State Department report that conflated the two prongs of
the defense by providing child sexual abuse as an example of an “intolerable
situation.”155 Sex abuse also poses a “grave risk of harm” to a child, so using
that as an example of an “intolerable situation” made it appear that there is
no distinction between the two prongs of the defense, even though they are
separate and a “grave risk of harm” is not required for an “intolerable
situation.”156
147. No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011).
148. See id. at *5.
149. Id.
150. See Estin, supra note 13, at 812.
151. Id. at 812–13.
152. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 139.
153. Id.
154. See Merle H. Weiner, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following
Switzerland’s Example in Hague Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 345 (2008).
155. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51
Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986) (explaining that an example of an “intolerable
situation” is when a parent sexually abuses the child and that, if the other parent removes the
child to protect him or her from that abuse, the court may deny the petition for return because
Article 13(b) is satisfied); see also Weiner, supra note 154, at 345–46.
156. See Weiner, supra note 154, at 345–46. To understand why the failure to disaggregate
the two prongs of Article 13(b) is not consistent with the plain meaning of the text of the
defense, the intent of the framers, and the overarching purposes of the Convention, see infra
notes 180–95 and accompanying text.
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C. Plausible Challenges to Disaggregating the Prongs of Article 13(b) and
Creating a Broader Definition of Zone of War
A potential criticism of this Note’s argument to disaggregate the two
prongs of Article 13(b) is that doing so creates an “unwieldy standard” in
contravention of the Convention’s goal to promptly return abducted children
to their states of habitual residence.157 In other words, such critics argue that
broadening Article 13(b) in this way and requiring U.S. courts to do an indepth “intolerable situation” analysis makes Hague cases more timeconsuming, expensive, and difficult, and prevents the immediate and
efficient return of an abducted child.158
While one of the Convention’s goals is to promptly return a wrongfully
removed or retained child to his or her state of habitual residence, the
Convention also recognizes that the interests of children are extremely
important in custody matters.159 To this end, the Convention’s explanatory
report clarifies that protecting a child from a “grave risk of harm” or an
“intolerable situation” is more important than promptly returning the
child.160 In this way, Article 13(b) recognizes unique situations where the
goals of deterring international child abduction and promoting the efficient
return of wrongfully removed or retained children are outweighed by the best
interests of the child.161
A second potential objection to the expansion of the scope of Article 13(b),
and “zone of war” in particular, is that parties will use the broader definition
to exploit political conflict or regional instability for their own benefit as a
tool to gain custody of their children.162 One scholar, Andrew Zashin, argues
that courts should use the “clean hands” doctrine to prevent parties from
acting in this way.163 By clean hands doctrine, Zashin means that a party
who voluntarily moves to a state where there is known violence, instability,
or safety concerns cannot later exploit such fears for personal gain and raise
an Article 13(b) defense in a Hague case.164 To raise Article 13(b) in such a
case, the party would have to prove either that the move was not voluntary,
or that he or she was ignorant of the dangers associated with the state in
question and immediately sought relocation after learning of the safety
concerns.165

157. Piemonte, supra note 4, at 211.
158. See id. at 212.
159. See Convention, supra note 1, at 4.
160. See Simpson, supra note 48, at 858–59; see also Piemonte, supra note 4, at 210
(explaining that a child’s interest in not being removed from his or her state of habitual
residence gives way to the child’s interest in not being exposed to a “grave risk of harm” or
placed in an “intolerable situation”).
161. See Estin, supra note 13, at 809; see also Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1,
15–16 (2014) (holding that the Convention’s goals of deterring child abduction and promptly
returning abducted children may be overcome by Article 13(b) concerns).
162. See Zashin, supra note 31, at 126.
163. See id. at 138–39.
164. Id.
165. See id.
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Applying this doctrine to the cases cited in this Note’s introduction and
Part III.A,166 in Bernal v. Gonzalez, Bernal and Gonzalez voluntarily moved
The court, however,
to Mexico together with their children.167
acknowledged that this was “a difficult case” and that Gonzalez “had rational
reasons for taking his children” from Mexico to the United States.168 As
such, it does not appear that the court thought that Gonzalez was attempting
to exploit the instability in Mexico for his personal gain.169 Similarly, in
Rodriguez v. Sieler, Rodriguez and Sieler also moved voluntarily to Mexico
together.170 The court again characterized Sieler’s concerns for his
children’s safety as “sincere,” indicating that the court did not believe that he
raised Article 13(b) for self-serving reasons.171
In Vazquez v. Estrada, Vazquez and Estrada, born in Mexico, lived with
their children in Dallas, Texas, until Vazquez was deported.172 Similarly, in
Castro v. Martinez, while Castro lived in Mexico with their child, Martinez
was a resident of San Antonio, Texas, and it does not appear from the facts
that he ever lived in Mexico.173 As such, the “clean hands” doctrine does not
seem to apply to the respondents in those cases, as they did not voluntarily
move with their families to Mexico.174
While the “clean hands” doctrine is a useful tool to ensure that parties do
not exploit political instability or regional violence for personal gain, the
objective standard established in Part IV.B.2 of this Note would also
accomplish the same goal.175 This standard ties the existence of an
“intolerable situation” to specific factors, such as the endangerment of the
child when he or she is held at gunpoint, familial participation in a cartel or
close proximity to cartel activity, and exposure to multiple dead bodies
hanging from overpasses or floating in rivers near the child’s home.176 In
other words, a party still has to prove the existence of objective factors that
create an “intolerable situation” for a child, thus ensuring that Article 13(b)
is not used to exploit political instability, unfairly target impoverished states,
or “encompass situations such as return to a home where money is in short
supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited than in
the new country.”177

166. See supra notes 5–21, 138–49 and accompanying text.
167. Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
168. Id. at 930.
169. See id.
170. Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 5430369, at *1 (D. Mont.
Nov. 7, 2012).
171. Id. at *8.
172. Vazquez v. Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
19, 2011). After Vazquez was deported, the children lived with Vazquez in Mexico and visited
Estrada in the United States during their winter and summer breaks. Id.
173. See Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
174. See id.; see also Vazquez, 2011 WL 196164, at *1.
175. See Zashin, supra note 31, at 139; see also supra Part IV.B.2.
176. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
177. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364–65 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
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Thus, expanding the scope of Article 13(b) does not contravene the
purposes of the Convention, as the Convention recognizes that “the interests
of children are paramount” in custody determinations, and it better serves an
abducted child’s interests to ensure that he or she is not exposed to a “grave
risk of harm” or an “intolerable situation” than to promptly return him or her
to his or her state of habitual residence.178 Further, the objective standard
defined in Part IV.B.2 should prevent parties from exploiting a more
expansive Article 13(b) for their personal gain.179
IV. THE TWO PRONGS OF ARTICLE 13(B) SHOULD BE DISAGGREGATED TO
ALLOW ZONE OF WAR TO COVER UNSAFE AND UNSTABLE SITUATIONS
To adequately protect the children involved in Hague cases, U.S. courts
must disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b) and fully analyze the
“intolerable situation” prong of the defense. This allows courts to expand the
definition of zone of war to include unsafe and unstable situations, even if a
party cannot identify a specific risk of harm directed at an individual child.
Part IV.A highlights the textual and theoretical reasons why U.S. courts must
disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b), and Part IV.B demonstrates
through case law why conducting an “intolerable situation” analysis allows
courts to expand the definition of zone of war.
A. U.S. Courts Must Disaggregate the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) to
Better Serve the Text and Purposes of the Convention
It is critical that U.S. courts universally disaggregate the “grave risk of
harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs of Article 13(b). Part IV.A.1
explains that the plain meaning of the text of the article requires that courts
conduct both a “grave risk of harm” and an “intolerable situation” analysis.
Part IV.A.2 provides evidence that the framers of the Convention intended
for the two prongs of Article 13(b) to be distinct and for the “intolerable
situation” prong to cover situations that the “grave risk of harm” prong does
not. Part IV.A.3 then analyzes how the Convention’s goal of protecting
children and consideration their best interests also requires courts to
disaggregate the prongs of Article 13(b).
1. Disaggregating “Grave Risk of Harm” and “Intolerable Situation” Is
Required by the Text of Article 13(b)
The analysis in a Hague case must start with the text of the Convention.180
In Abbott v. Abbott,181 the Supreme Court identified four sources that courts
should use to help them decide a Hague case: (1) the text of the Convention;
(2) the objectives of the Convention; (3) the views of the U.S. Department of
178. Convention, supra note 1, at 4.; see also Estin, supra note 13, at 809; Piemonte, supra
note 4, at 210; Simpson, supra note 48, at 858–59.
179. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
180. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2010); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 12.
181. 560 U.S. 1 (2010).
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State, especially opinions of the Office of Children’s Issues; and (4) the
decisions of other signatory states to the Convention.182 The Court further
held that “[t]he interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute,
begins with its text.”183 Grounding a Hague case in the text of the
Convention ensures that all of the signatories to the Convention are
consistent in their interpretation of the treaty.184
The text of Article 13(b) provides that a court is not obligated to order the
return of a child where “there is a grave risk that his or her return would
expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation.”185 The plain language of the text
demonstrates that Article 13(b) requires courts to consider whether returning
the child would expose him or her to a “grave risk of harm” or place him or
her in an “intolerable situation.”186
As such, the failure to disaggregate the two prongs of Article 13(b) causes
courts to misinterpret the plain meaning of the text of the defense and
“unnecessarily limit[s]” its scope;187 a situation may create an “intolerable
situation” for a child but not expose him or her to a “grave risk of harm.”188
2. The Framers of the Convention Intended the Two Prongs of Article
13(b) to Be Separate and Distinct
When drafting the Convention, the framers intended the two prongs of
Article 13(b) to be independent and distinct, with the two prongs covering
different scenarios.189 As the U.K. delegate to the Hague Conference
explicitly recognized, the “intolerable situation” prong of the defense was
meant to protect children in cases where their return would not necessarily
expose them to a “grave risk of harm” but would nonetheless place them in
an unsafe or unbearable environment.190 To this end, one scholar, Merle
Weiner, explicitly theorizes that returning a child to a zone of war is an
example of a circumstance where the child’s return may place him or her in
an “intolerable situation” but not necessarily expose him or her to a “grave
risk of harm.”191
182. See id. at 9–10.
183. Id. at 10 (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008)).
184. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 15; see also Courtney E. Hoben, Comment, The
Hague Convention on International Parental Kidnapping: Closing the Article 13(b)
Loophole, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 271, 276–77 (1999) (“If courts within and between
Contracting States are interpreting the language of the [Convention] differently, [it] cannot be
an effective tool for combating the problem of international parental kidnapping.”).
185. Convention, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added).
186. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2002); see
also HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38 (noting that the “intolerable situation” prong of
Article 13(b) is independent from the “grave risk of harm” prong of the defense).
187. Weiner, supra note 154, at 348; see also Pliego v. Hayes, 843 F.3d 226, 232–33 (6th
Cir. 2016) (explaining that the ordinary meaning of Article 13(b) “suggests that an ‘intolerable
situation’ must be different from ‘physical or psychological harm,’ but nevertheless serious”).
188. See Weiner, supra note 154, at 348–49.
189. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 151.
190. See id. at 136, 151.
191. See Weiner, supra note 154, at 349.
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3. Disaggregating the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) Better Serves the
Overarching Purposes of the Convention
While the Supreme Court in Abbott held that any analysis in a Hague case
should start with the text of the Convention, the Court also emphasized that
U.S. courts should consider the objectives of the Convention when deciding
a Hague case.192 To this end, as explained in Part III.C, the Convention
recognizes that the interests of children are “of paramount importance” in
custody determinations.193 In other words, protecting the best interests of
children is an overarching goal of the Convention, and it is therefore more
important that a child not be exposed to a “grave risk of harm” or placed in
an “intolerable situation” than it is that a child be promptly returned.194 As
such, the extremely narrow interpretation of Article 13(b), and zone of war
in particular, that is currently employed by U.S. courts misunderstands the
true purposes of the Convention; it is not in a child’s best interest to return to
an environment that is objectively “intolerable” simply because the party
raising an Article 13(b) defense is unable to identify a specific threat of harm
directed at the individual child.195
B. A Broader Definition of Zone of War
Disaggregating the two prongs of Article 13(b) allows for a broader
definition of zone of war. Part IV.B.1 evaluates how the courts that have
conducted an in-depth analysis of “intolerable situation” define and apply the
prong. Part IV.B.2 applies the principles evident from this limited case law
to the cartel cases discussed in Part III.A. This section argues that analyzing
the “intolerable situation” prong of Article 13(b) broadens the definition of
zone of war to include volatile and unstable situations and identifies specific
and objective factors that indicate the existence of such an environment.
1. The Limited “Intolerable Situation” Case Law Allows Courts to
Consider the Environment to Which a Child Will Be Returned
The word “intolerable” is commonly defined as unbearable, unendurable,
and excessive.196 In the context of the Convention, “intolerable” was meant

192. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2010); see also GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 14
(“When a court wrestles with interpreting a particular provision of the Convention, deference
should be given to the purposes of the Convention.”).
193. Convention, supra note 1, at 4.; see also Simpson, supra note 48, at 859 (“[A]lthough
the objects of the [Convention] are to secure the return of a child who was wrongfully
removed, and to respect the custody laws of the child’s home country, the interest of the child
is overriding.” (footnote omitted)).
194. See supra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 211–16 and accompanying text; see also Simpson, supra note 48, at
849.
196. Intolerable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
intolerable [https://perma.cc/P9SR-3ETU] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Weiner, supra
note 154, at 352 (discussing definitions of “intolerable”).
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to “evoke an objective sense that return was unwarranted” for physical,
psychological, or moral reasons.197
With those definitions in mind, when U.S. courts do conduct an in-depth
analysis of Article 13(b)’s “intolerable situation” prong, they hold that such
analysis “must encompass some evaluation of the people and circumstances
awaiting that child in the [state] of his [or her] habitual residence.”198 In
other words, analyzing the “intolerable situation” prong of the defense allows
courts to “consider the environment in which the child will reside upon
returning” to his or her state of habitual residence.199 As such, courts conduct
a more well-rounded analysis when they consider the “intolerable situation”
prong of Article 13(b), as they are not limited to simply looking for a specific
threat of harm directed at the individual child.200
These principles were evident in Wilchynski v. Wilchynski201 and Krefter
v. Wills,202 two recent cases where the courts performed “intolerable
situation” analyses. In these cases, the courts considered whether “desperate
financial conditions” constituted an “intolerable situation.”203 While both
courts acknowledged that poverty alone does not usually establish an
“intolerable situation,” they held that the severity of the economic difficulties
to which the children would be returning allowed them to impose
undertakings on the children’s returns so that no potential harms could
manifest.204 Specifically, the courts ordered the parties petitioning for the
children’s return to pay several months of child support and the cost of the
airfare to fly back to the state of habitual residence in advance of the
children’s return.205 This undertaking allowed the opposing parties to live in
the state of habitual residence while the custody dispute was resolved.206
These examples show how an “intolerable situation” analysis works in
practice, with courts evaluating the nature of the environment to which the
child will be returned and implementing undertakings to make that
environment more tolerable for the child, thus promoting the child’s best
interests.207 All U.S. courts should conduct similar “intolerable situation”
analyses, especially in the zone of war context, to better protect the children
involved in Hague cases.208
197. Weiner, supra note 154, at 352.
198. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2002); see
also Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that an
“intolerable situation” analysis requires an in-depth evaluation of the state of habitual
residence’s political stability and ability to hear the custody dispute).
199. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1364.
200. See id.; see also Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377; Silverman v. Silverman, No. CIV.
00-2274 (JRT), 2002 WL 971808, at *8 (D. Minn. May 9, 2002), rev’d, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir.
2003).
201. No. 3:10-CV-63-FKB, 2010 WL 1068070 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2010).
202. 623 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2009).
203. GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 113.
204. See Wilchynski, 2010 WL 1068070, at *8–11; Krefter, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 136–38.
205. See Wilchynski, 2010 WL 1068070, at *10–11; Krefter, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 136–38.
206. See supra note 205.
207. See supra note 205.
208. See supra note 205.
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2. The Application of the Principles Identified from the Limited
“Intolerable Situation” Case Law to the Zone of War Context
It is possible to evaluate how the courts in the cases discussed in the
introduction and Part III.A would have analyzed the zone of war claims
differently if both prongs of Article 13(b) had been fully considered, which
would have better served the plain meaning of the text of the defense, the
intent of the framers of the Convention, and the purposes of the Convention.
As explained above, disaggregating the two prongs of Article 13(b) allows
the court to consider the nature of the environment to which the child would
be returned.209 Thus, evaluating both prongs of Article 13(b) allows courts
to expand the definition of zone of war to include volatile and unsafe
situations that are objectively “physically, mentally, or morally
‘intolerable.’”210
To this end, in Bernal v. Gonzalez, Gonzalez testified that the cartel
activity was ratcheting up in his children’s neighborhood and that he saw
dead bodies floating in a river near the family home.211 Gonzalez’s son
further testified he was stopped at gunpoint by “thugs.”212 Similarly, in
Rodriguez v. Sieler, Sieler testified that, among other things, the region the
children lived in was under military control because of drug cartel activity,
dead bodies hung off of overpasses in the children’s neighborhood, his
brother-in-law may be involved with the cartel, and the house across the
street from where the children lived was a “drug house.”213 In addition, in
Castro v. Martinez, Martinez also testified that one or more of Castro’s
relatives may have been sympathetic to or active participants in the cartel.214
When there is objective evidence that returning children would expose
them to multiple dead bodies in their neighborhoods, force them to be around
cartel activity, or place them in the same environments where they were
previously held at gunpoint, the “intolerable situation” prong of Article 13(b)
is satisfied.215 Even if there is no specific threat of harm directed at the
individual children in these cases, the unsafe and volatile environments in
which they would be forced to live upon their returns constitute intolerable
situations.216

209. See Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995); Mendez Lynch
v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Silverman v. Silverman, No.
CIV. 00-2274 (JRT), 2002 WL 971808, at *8 (D. Minn. May 9, 2002), rev’d, 338 F.3d 886
(8th Cir. 2003).
210. Weiner, supra note 154, at 352.
211. Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907, 920–21 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
212. Id. at 921.
213. Rodriguez v. Sieler, No. CV 12-167-M-DLC, 2012 WL 5430369, at *7 (D. Mont.
Nov. 7, 2012).
214. Castro v. Martinez, 872 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550–51 (W.D. Tex. 2012). Martinez
provided “a photograph of [Castro’s] relatives allegedly flashing a gang sign.” Id. at 551 n.8.
215. See id.; see also Bernal, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21; Sieler, 2012 WL 5430369, at *7.
216. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364–65 (M.D. Fla.
2002).
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Even if a court ultimately decides to return the child in cases similar to the
ones described above, the court can use the existence of an “intolerable
situation” to condition the child’s return on undertakings.217 For example,
the court could allow the child’s return on the condition that the child neither
interact with nor be placed in the care of any relatives in a cartel; that the
petitioner increase security measures in his or her home if the family home
is located near a drug house or cartel activity; or that the child is placed in
therapy so that he or she can talk through his or her exposure to violence and
death.218 These undertakings are specifically designed to protect children in
circumstances that would otherwise constitute an “intolerable situation.”219
In contrast to the cases discussed above, in Vazquez v. Estrada, Estrada
provided evidence that the neighborhood where the child lived was violent,
but he did not identify a specific situation where the child had been
endangered, provide evidence that a family member of the child is in a cartel
and that the child would therefore be exposed to cartel activity if returned, or
testify to the prevalence of dead bodies in the child’s neighborhood.220 As
such, Estrada did not prove that an “intolerable situation” existed;221 the
identification of the objective factors described above are necessary to ensure
that courts do not hold that Article 13(b) is satisfied simply because of
unfavorable living conditions or general regional violence.222
Even though Article 13(b) should not be available in cases that do not
present any of the objective factors listed above, a few courts allow for the
use of undertakings even in cases where the defense is not met.223 Thus, a
court may require that a child returning to a violent region be placed in
therapy or that the petitioner add security measures to the child’s home, even
if the respondent did not describe any of the objective factors identified
above.224
CONCLUSION
U.S. courts must analyze Article 13(b) claims under both prongs of the
defense to properly interpret the plain meaning of the text of the article, honor
the intention of the framers of the Convention, and better serve the purposes
of the Convention.225 Conducting an “intolerable situation” analysis of zone
217. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137–38; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.
218. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137, 142–43; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.
219. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 25, at 163. Of course, the issues with the
enforcement of undertakings discussed in Part II.B are still applicable. See supra notes 121–
25 and accompanying text.
220. See Vazquez v. Estrada, No. 3:10-CV-2519-BF, 2011 WL 196164, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2011).
221. See id.
222. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364–65 (M.D. Fla.
2002); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 111.
223. See Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2008); Wilchynski v. Wilchynski, No.
3:10-CV-63-FKB, 2010 WL 1068070, at *8–11 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2010); Krefter v. Wills,
623 F. Supp. 2d 125, 136–38 (D. Mass. 2009); GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137–38.
224. See GARBOLINO, supra note 33, at 137, 142–43; HARALAMBIE, supra note 13, § 2:38.
225. See supra notes 180–95 and accompanying text.
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of war claims, and thus evaluating the environment to which the child will
be returned, allows courts to expand the definition of zone of war to include
unsafe and unstable situations, regardless of whether the party raising the
defense identifies a specific risk of harm directed at the individual child.226
Children are a particularly vulnerable population, and U.S. courts must fully
analyze both the “grave risk of harm” and “intolerable situation” prongs of
Article 13(b) to ensure that they are adequately protected in Hague cases and
are not returned to an unbearable environment.227 In other words, U.S. courts
must fully evaluate both prongs of Article 13(b), as being exposed to an
“intolerable situation” can cripple the health, development, and well-being
of children, the group whose interests the Convention recognizes as being
“of paramount importance.”228

226. See supra notes 196–224 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
228. Convention, supra note 1, at 4.

